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Ramaekers, M. J. M., Levels, M., Dronkers†, J. & Kraaykamp, G. (2018). Explaining civic attitudes of immigrant children in Europe. Hungarian Educational Research Journal, 8(1), 11-36, DOI:10.14413/HERJ/8/1/2
Explaining Civic Attitudes of Immigrant Children in Europe
Marlou J. M. Ramaekers[1], Mark Levels[2], Jaap Dronkers†, Gerbert Kraaykamp[3]
Abstract
In this study, we investigate explanations for differentiation in civic attitudes among immigrant children from different religious groups. We use the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Study data to explore differences between religious groups on three key civic attitudes: support for democracy, support for gender equality, and attitudes towards the country of destination. We analyse N=5454 immigrant students in eleven European destination countries using OLS regression with origin and destination country fixed effects. Our results, firstly, show that Orthodox Christian and Islamic immigrant children are less in favour of gender equality than secular immigrant children. Different attitudes towards the role of religion in society explain most of this variation. Secondly, Islamic, Protestant and Catholic immigrant children are more likely to think positively of their destination country than secular and Christian Orthodox immigrant children. These differences can be explained by church attendance and attitudes towards the influence of religion in society.
Keywords: immigrant students, civic attitudes, religious groups  
 
Introduction
To what extent does religion matter for the cultural integration of immigrant children in Western countries? Literature on civic behaviours and attitudes shows that not only social demographic characteristics, such as gender (Torney-Purta, Lehman, Oswald & Schulz, 2001; Miklikowska & Hurme, 2011, p. 550) and age (Diehl, Koenig & Ruckdeschel, 2009) are related to civic behaviour and attitudes, but that religion also is of importance (Graaf & Ruiter, 2006; Diehl, Koenig & Ruckdeschel, 2009; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr & Losito, 2010). Principally, religious communities stimulate people to participate in debates or decision-making processes, helping them to practice skills needed for citizenship (Van Gunsteren, 1992; Fermin, 2000), and religious citizens are also more likely to volunteer than secular citizens (Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). It further seem clear that religious people are generally less in favour of equality between the sexes (Seguino, 2011; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). Additionally, civic attitudes and behaviours have been found to differ between various denominations (Lam, 2002; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). For instance, Protestants are more likely to volunteer, and to be a member of a voluntary organisation than Catholics (Lam, 2002; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006), and Catholics and Orthodox Christians are more supportive of democracy than Protestants and Muslims (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012).
The extent to which these notions apply to immigrant children is not widely studied. Religion is only scarcely used in research looking at immigrants’ civic attitudes (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Roder, 2014). For immigrants, religious groups are closely related to citizenship, as religious communities are important places for them to practice democracy and to position themselves in the public domain (Eck, 2001; Allen, 2010). Research on the explanation of civic attitudes of immigrant children is however limited (Kim, 2013). Therefore, our first objective is to describe the extent to which immigrant children of various denominations and secular immigrant children hold different civic attitudes. Our second and main objective is to explain why religion matters for immigrant children’s civic attitudes. To do so, we explore four main explanations. First, we consider children’s  attendance of religious services to explore the extent to which this can explain differences. Secondly, we explore the role of institutional trust, and thirdly we examine children’s attitudes toward the role of religion in society. Fourthly, civic competences and knowledge are considered as an explanation for the differences between immigrant children from various religious groups. In our analyses, we deal with confounders of socioeconomic nature, and for region of origin, and country of destination. This way, we can be sure that found differences are not due to differences between socioeconomic, ethnic or national groups, but refer to actual differences between religious groups.
Our study focusses on three types of civic attitudes. First, support for democratic values, such as freedom of expression and the freedom to criticize government is investigated. These values are at the core of liberal democracy and essential to the civic republican model (Hoskins & Kerr, 2012). Second, we address attitudes towards gender equality, because they exemplify the general idea of equity. Third, we focus on attitudes towards the destination country that encompass national pride and satisfaction with the country’s functioning. Since our study is limited to European democratic countries’, satisfaction with the functioning of a destination country implies the support for a liberal democratic ideology. In order to explore the relationship between religion and three types of civic attitudes, we will address the following questions in this paper: 1) To what extent do religious and non-religious immigrant children and immigrant children of various denominations differ in their civic attitudes? And 2) To what extent can these differences be explained by religious service attendance, institutional trust, attitudes on the role of religion in society and civic competences and knowledge?
In order to answer our research questions we derive hypotheses from various sociological notions. We use the International Civic and Citizenship Study [ICCS] data from 2009 to test these hypotheses. This dataset refers to the civic behaviours and attitudes of eighth-grader generally thirteen or fourteen years old. We will restrict or analyses to immigrant  children in destination countries in Europe. Employing OLS regression, we assess the differences between religious and non-religious immigrant children, and between immigrant children with various religious denominations.  
Before turning to theory and hypotheses, it is important to address how we understand civic attitudes. Civic attitudes are seen as being related to effective and efficient citizenship, and in liberal democracies, they are indicative of the extent of adherence to democratic rules and prevailing cultural values. Citizenship however is not an objective concept; it is largely normative. What is considered good citizenship or being a good citizen is likely different in different groups, in different times and in different places. So, no absolute set of rules is existing about what a good citizen should do and think, but many (Hoskins & Kerr, 2012). In this paper, we employ and advance the so-called civic republican model of citizenship. This model emphasizes the need for citizens to learn civic competences including values on which liberal democracy is founded (Hoskins & Kerr, 2012). Put differently, people are learned to believe that everyone should be able to express their own opinion, that people elect freely their own leaders and that everyone should be treated equally by the law and by all others. Whenever we refer to citizenship in this study we will allude to this civic republican model. We will not discuss whether this is the correct or best characterisation of citizenship. Our goal is mainly to explore the extent to which attitudes linked to this notion of citizenship are supported by immigrant children. The question whether these civic attitudes actually make immigrant children “good” citizens is a philosophical one, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Theory
The origins of civic attitudes
Civic attitudes already arise at a very young age, sometimes as early as the age of six. Although children of this age rarely understand the complexity of politics and society, they are capable of categorizing and developing social identities that could be seen as politically relevant (Bennett & Sani, 2003). Moreover, children from the age of six already display value orientations about gender equality and civic virtues (Abendschon, 2013). According to Bandura’s social learning theory (1977), children acquire these orientations and values by observing others and imitating role models. People transmitting values to children are not necessarily consciously teaching children. Instead, children can learn values from any behavior, even if a person that is observed or imitated, is unaware.
In early childhood, parents are considered the most important socializing agents for their children (Grusec & Davidov, 2008). This is not surprising given that young children spend most of their time at home with their family. From the literature on political socialization literature also arguments are found that early socialization on civic values starts in the family (Abendschon, 2013). Although parents likely have a lasting impact on their children (Siongers, 2007; Bowers, 2009; Dostie-Goulet, 2009; Brañas-Garza, Espinosa & Giritligil, 2013; Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2015), other socializing agents are influential when children are maturing. Especially, teachers at school and friends are found responsible for transmitting political attitudes in late adolescence (Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2005). Both provide role models that children may observe and imitate. Prior research, for instance, showed that political attitudes of adolescents are partly understood by looking at political attitudes of close friends (Dostie-Goulet, 2009; Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2015). Finally, schooling is seen as a main factor. Through programs in civic education children learn the values that governments deem important for becoming an active participating citizen in society. Learning civic attitudes in the school setting however is not voluntary, which makes this type of socialization less effective than learning from family and friends (Dostie-Goulet, 2009; Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2015). Besides primary socializing agents, secondary parties, such as religious groups, are considered relevant for the socialization of civic attitudes as well (Manza & Brooks, 1997; Ojeda & Hatemi, 2015). This is the focus of our paper, and therefore we discuss the relationship between religion and civic attitudes below.
The role of religion and denominations
In literature, two theoretical notions arrive at opposing ideas on the association between religion and civic attitudes. First, one part of the literature claims that religion makes people to have more positive civic attitudes. Moreover, it is argued that religious individuals are more likely to engage in civic behaviours and to possess more civic competences. Belonging to a religious group would enhance a person’s formal social capital (Smith, 1999; Crystal and DeBell, 2002; Foner and Alba, 2008), and nurtures institutional and interpersonal trust (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanneti, 1993), which makes people more willing to invest time, money, and effort in a community and in society. Additionally, it is presumed that religiosity would promote behavioural norms closely related to citizenship, such as donating to charity and helping others (Grundel & Maliepaard, 2012; Smith, 1999). From these notions it could be supposed that positive effects of religion on civic behaviours spills over to civic attitudes. This spill-over assumption, however, has not been confirmed by empirical research. We therefore assume this mechanism mainly applicable to civic behaviour, and not to civic attitudes.
Second, a contrasting literature assumes a negative relation between religion and civic attitude; religious people would have less positive civic attitudes than secular people. In this tradition it is stated that the basic values underlying religiosity and democracy inherently oppose each other (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013). Religion is based the belief that there is a transcendent and all-encompassing truth. In order to be a good citizen according to the civic republican notion of citizenship a person has to be critical and open to change. Moreover, democratic values emphasize independence reasoning; citizens have the right to believe, act and think autonomously. Religion, on the other hand, emphasizes the duties of believers in a God and his followers. In empirical research, this tradition finds most support. Generally, religiosity is negatively associated with openness to change and self-expression values (Saroglou, Delpierre & Dernelle, 2004), both closely related to democratic values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Further, religious people seem less in favour of gender equality (Seguino, 2011; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014), and hold more traditional opinions on gender roles (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). Because the idea of a negative association between religious adherence and civic attitudes is supported by more empirical research, our first hypothesis reads: Religious immigrant children are less supportive of democracy (a), gender equality (b), and are less positive towards their democratic destination country (c) than secular immigrant children.
Although we expect that religious and secular immigrant children will differ in their civic attitudes, not all religious immigrant children will differ to the same extent from their non-religious counterparts. The gap between secular and religious immigrant children may be larger for immigrant children adhering to denominations that are culturally less close to Western liberal democratic values. Below we discuss why denominations would differ. It is important to acknowledge that all religions hold their own view on the world, how it should look like, and what cultural norms and values should prevail. These norms and values guide devotees through life, providing them with a framework fit for all their actions. Consequently, religious norms and values may unintendedly have an impact on situations, behaviour and attitudes that are hardly related to religious notions. A classic example would be the relation between Protestantism and capitalism. Even though Protestantism does not explicitly state how one should behave financially, it does promote working hard and frugally spending money, thereby providing Protestants with cultural norms that fostered the rise of capitalism (Weber, 1905). Another example is provided by Huntington (1996) who argued that certain civilizations are more compatible with democracy, than others because their culture matches democratic values, such as the separation between church and state, better. So it seems that in denominations different cultural norms exist that may lead to different notions of citizenship and civic attitudes (Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995). It is found that Muslims and Hindus are generally less in favor of gender equality, than people who adhere to a Christian religion (Seguino & Lovinsky, 2009). Moreover, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Catholics and Muslims hold more pro-democratic attitudes than Evangelicals (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2012). Because prior research does not unequivocally show how denominational differences are translated in civic attitudes, we do not formulate a directional hypothesis. We expect that: Differences in the support for democratic values (a), gender equality (b) and attitudes towards their democratic destination country (c) exist between immigrant children of different denominations.
Explaining denominational differentiation of civic attitudes
Attending religious services
Attending religious services is often seen as a sign of being integrated in a religious community, because one meets fellow believers and more easily becomes actively involved (Carabain & Bekkers, 2010). It therefore is likely that the degree of integration in a religious denomination affect a person’s norms and values; more integration leads to more adherence to particular religious norms. Indeed, several studies report that attendance of religious services is related to more civic behaviour. It would have a positive effect on volunteering (Bekkers, 2005; 2007) and on giving charitable donations (Berger, 2006; Bekkers, 2011). Additionally, it is found that people who attend religious services are more likely to vote (Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001; Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2010), to be a member of a political party and involved in political action (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010). Likely, this idea applies to civic attitudes and values too. Indeed, research showed that religious attendance is positively associated with political, civil and social citizenship responsibilities for Christians (Bolzendahl & Coffe, 2009). Moreover, Catholics, Muslims, Christian Orthodox and Evangelicals who show more social religious behaviour endorse democracy more, are more supportive of democratic procedures and regard democracy as a more desirable way of governing (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013). Because people of different denominations obviously differ in their frequency of religious attendance (Cadge & Ecklund, 2006; Connor, 2009), it is expected that they differ in their civic attitudes as well. Our explanatory hypothesis reads: Differences in the support for democratic values (a), gender equality (b) and attitudes towards their democratic destination country (c), between immigrant children of different denominations decrease if controlled for religious services attendance.
Attitudes on the role of religion in society
Religious and non-religious people have different opinions on the role of religion in society. Likely, when an individual sees religion as extremely relevant in personal life, religious rules are considered important for society as well (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr & Losito, 2010). Therefore, it may be expected that religious immigrant children will think more positively on an active role of religion for society than secular immigrant children. Additionally, immigrant children from different denominations may vary in their views on the role of religion in society. Based on specific religious beliefs and rules, in each community specific norms exist, among those on the broader role of religion, that largely are followed by adherents (Van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011).
The opinion that religion should have a large role in the working of society principally is in contrast with the notions of separation of church and state prominent in most democracies. In addition, various religious denomination holds restrictive ideas on gender equality and freedom of expression that are in conflict with the civic values underlying democracy (Ben-Nun Bloom & Arikan, 2013). Hence, the view that religion should have a large role in society is in contradiction with ideas on modern civic attitudes and behaviours. From this reasoning the next hypothesis states: Differences in their support for democracy (a), gender equality (b) and attitudes towards the democratic destination country (c), between religious and secular immigrant children and between immigrant children of different denominations decrease if controlled for attitudes on the role of religion in society
Civic competences and knowledge
Having civic competencies may also affect a person’s civic attitudes (Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Torgler & Dong, 2008; Cheng, Bynner, Wiggings & Schoon, 2012; Barber, Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld & Ross, 2015). Civic competency not only leads to more political participation (Cohen, Vigoda, Samorly, 2001; Becker, 2004; Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010), but it also endorses certain civic values (Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Torgler & Don, 2008). For example, people who discuss political issues and are more interested in politics seem less likely to regard corruption as justifiable (Torgler & Dong, 2008). Moreover, political interest and support for gender equality are related (Cheng, Bynner, Wiggings & Schoon, 2012); those interested in politics are more likely to endorse equality between the sexes. Also, people who possess more civic knowledge are more tolerant (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), they show more support for women’s rights and find it more important that citizens have the right to criticize the government (Janmaat, 2008).
Adhering to a religion and having civic competences may be positively related (Attar-Schwartz & Ben-Arieh, 2012; Grundel & Maliepaard, 2012; Coffe, 2013); religious communities would teach their members civic skills, such as political efficacy and political interest. It is however clear that the nurturing of civic competences is mainly related to supporting their own community members (Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995). Consequently, the nurturing of civic competences is different in different denominations (Grundel &Maliepaard, 2012). It is therefore that we expect that: Differences in their support for democracy (a), gender equality (b), and attitudes towards the democratic destination country (c), between religious and secular immigrant children and between immigrant children of different denominations increase if controlled for civic knowledge and competences.
Data
We use the International Civic and Citizenship Study [ICCS] data from 2009 (IEA, 2009) to test our hypotheses. Initially, the ICCS data were collected in 38 countries (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, Zuehlke, 2011d). Since our interest lies with democratic Western values, we only use the data collected in Europe. Countries further were excluded for several reasons. First, countries were excluded if there was no information available on the religion of immigrant children. This concerned Estonia, Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Moreover, England was excluded because it was impossible to differentiate between the various Christian denominations. Second, countries were excluded without information about the country of origin of immigrant children. This applied to Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia. Third, we excluded the Czech Republic because its measurement of civic attitudes did not correspond with all other countries, possibly pointing at a limited cross-cultural validity. In the final analyses eleven countries were included: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Switzerland.
Table 1: Overview of reasons for the exclusion of countries
 
Include/excluded
Reasons
Austria
Included
 
Belgium
Included
 
Bulgaria
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Cyprus
Included
 
Czech Republic
Excluded
Factor structure is different from all other countries
Denmark
Included
 
England
Excluded
It is impossible to differentiate between different Christian denominations
Estonia
Excluded
No information on religious background of children
Finland
Excluded
No information on religious background of children
Greece
Included
 
Ireland
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Italy
Excluded
No information on religious background of children
Latvia
Included
 
Liechtenstein
Included
 
Lithuania
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Luxembourg
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Malta
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Norway
Included
 
Poland
Included
 
Slovakia
Excluded
No information on country of origin
Slovenia
Excluded
No information on religious background
Spain
Excluded
No information on religious background
Sweden
Excluded
No information on religious background
Switzerland
Included
 
The Netherlands
Included
 
Since our hypotheses concern immigrant children, only children with a migration background are selected. We defined having a migration background as being born outside the current country of living or having parents that are born outside the current country of living.1 After excluding missing values on the dependent and independent variables, 5.454 immigrant students were left for the analyses.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables (N =5454)
 
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Support for democratic values
3.428
0.432
1.000
4.000
Support for gender equality
3.218
0.753
1.000
4.000
Attitudes towards the country of destination
2.871
0.585
1.000
4.000
 
 
 
 
 
Religion
 
 
 
 
No religion
0.144
 
0
1
Catholic
0.282
 
0
1
Protestant
0.094
 
0
1
Orthodox
0.222
 
0
1
Islam
0.186
 
0
1
Other
0.011
 
0
1
Generation
 
 
 
 
First generation immigrant
0.291
 
0
1
Second generation immigrant
0.709
 
0
1
 
 
 
 
 
Age
14.389
0.700
12.42
17.83
Gender
 
 
 
 
Male
0.471
 
0
1
Female
0.529
 
0
1
Expected further education
 
 
 
 
Don’t expect to complete ISCED 2
0.014
 
0
1
ISCED 2
0.072
 
0
1
ISCED 3
0.300
 
0
1
ISCED 4 or 5B
0.201
 
0
1
ISCED 5A or 6
0.413
 
0
1
Use of state language at home
 
 
 
 
Uses state language at home
0.661
 
0
1
Uses other language at home
0.339
 
0
1
Parental political interest
 
 
 
 
Not interested at all
0.025
 
0
1
Not very interested
0.195
 
0
1
Quite interested
0.517
 
0
1
Very interested
0.263
 
0
1
Family form
 
 
 
 
Nuclear family
0.714
 
0
1
Single parent family
0.182
 
0
1
Other family
0.105
 
0
1
Parental socioeconomic status
-0.102
1.115
-4.085
3.086
 
 
 
 
 
Country of destination
 
 
 
 
Austria
0.136
 
0
1
Cyprus
0.080
 
0
1
Denmark
0.117
 
0
1
Belgium (Flemish)
0.093
 
0
1
Greece
0.095
 
0
1
Latvia
0.094
 
0
1
Liechtenstein
0.039
 
0
1
The Netherlands
0.061
 
0
1
Norway
0.083
 
0
1
Poland
0.013
 
0
1
Switzerland
0.190
 
0
1
Region of origin
 
 
 
 
Eastern Europe
0.109
 
 
 
Northern Europe
0.045
 
 
 
Southern Europe
0.194
 
 
 
Western Europe
0.123
 
 
 
Asia
0.058
 
 
 
Africa
0.010
 
 
 
Latin America
0.010
 
 
 
Oceania
0.005
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attendance of religious services
1.764
1.395
0.000
4.000
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes towards the influence of religion in society
0.000
1.000
-2.005
1.824
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion of political and social issues
0.000
1.000
-1.409
3.019
Interest in political and social issues
0.000
1.000
-1.974
2.209
Internal political efficacy
0.000
1.000
-2.210
2.548
Citizenship self-efficacy
0.000
1.000
-2.808
2.333
Civic knowledge
149.285
9.846
109.876
193.433
Variables
Dependent variables
The dependent variables in this paper are 1) the support for democratic values, 2) attitudes towards gender equality, and 3) attitudes toward the country of destination. They are based on questions about attitudes from the survey. Of each topic several items were chosen and used to make a Likert scale. The Cronbach’s alphas for attitudes towards democracy, gender equality and the country of destination were 0.652, 0.756 and 0.814 respectively. In Appendix A the questions used for these scales can be found.
Independent variables
We use a number of independent variables. Students were asked about their religious affiliation with the question “What is your religion?” In each country children were given several options, which always included the option ‘no religion’. The other options differed between countries, matching the religious composition of each country’s population. We created six categories: No religion, Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodox-Christian, Islam and other religions. The category ‘Protestantism” includes Protestants, Jehovah Witnesses, Evangelists, Lutherans and Baptists. Non-Catholic Christians from Flanders belong to this category as well. The category ‘other religions’ consists of Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh students. In each country students that didn’t belong to any of religious groups mentioned in the response options, were placed in the category ‘other’. Dummy variables for all categories will used. Secular children will be the reference category.
Children were also asked how often they attended religious services outside their home. The response options were ‘never’, ‘less than once a year’, ‘at least once a year’, ‘at least once a month’ and ‘at least once a week’ (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz & Zuehlke, 2011a). Religious service attendance is an ordinal variable, but since using dummies does not explain more variance than using an interval variable, we use attendance as an interval variable in the analysis for reasons of parsimony.2
The attitudes towards the influence of religion in society are measured by asking the children several questions about what influence they think religion should have in society. All these questions were used to create a scale. The variable was standardized, so it had a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The measurement of civic knowledge is based on 98 items that test the knowledge students possess on civic society, civic principles, civic participation and civic identities (Schulz, Ainley & Fraillon, 2011). The scores were scaled using WLE and standardized afterwards. Civic knowledge has a mean of 150 and a standard deviation of 10 in each national sample (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, Zuehlke, 2011c). The civic competences that are taken into consideration in this paper are the discussion of political and social issues, political interest, internal political efficacy and citizenship self-efficacy. All of these competences were measured in similar ways. The children were asked a set of questions about these four topics. Several of these questions were selected for each topic and used to make a Likert scale. Afterwards, these variables were standardized, so each would have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in the sample of this study. Control variables
The immigrant generation refers to the number of generations of a family that have lived in the country of destination. Because the children are only asked about their parents’ and their own country of birth, it is not possible to distinguish between more generations than the first and the second. A child is regarded as a first-generation immigrant if they were born in a different country than they country they currently live in. A child is a second-generation immigrant if they were born in the country they live in, but their parent(s) were not. We also control for the age of the students in years. The age of the children ranged from 12 to 173. Gender was also controlled for, using a dummy indicating whether (1) or not (0) students were girls. Respondents were asked what level of education they thought they would achieve in the future. The response options were based on the national educational system. Afterwards the response options have been recoded into the categories of the international standard classification of education (ISCED), so the levels of education can be compared across Europe. The categories based on ISCED are ‘ISCED level 5A or 6’, ‘ISCED 4 or 5B’, ‘ISCED level 3’, ‘ISCED level 2’ and ‘I do not expect to complete ISCED level 2’ (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz & Zuehlke, 2011b). Since expected further education is an ordinal variable, the different categories will be added to the analyses as dummy variables. ‘I do not expect to complete ISCED level 2’ is the reference category.4 In order to measure the use of state language, children were asked what language they spoke at home most of the time. They could choose between the language of assessment and several other languages. What and how many languages they could choose from, depended on the country in which they lived (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke, 2011a). This information was recoded into a dichotomous variable with two categories: ‘student speaks state language at home’ (0) and ‘student speaks another language at home’ (1) (Schulz, Ainley, & Fraillon, 2011). Students had to report how interested they thought their parent(s) were in political and social issues. They reported the political interest of their mother and father separately. The response options for this questions were ‘very interested’, ‘quite interested’, ‘not very interested’ and ‘not interested at all’ (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz & Zuehlke, 2011a). The score for both parents was computed by taking the score of the parent that was most interested according to the student (Schulz, Ainley, & Fraillon, 2011). Dummy variables are used for each category. Children whose parents are not at all interested in political and social issues are the reference category. The family form of the students’ household is based on the question whether certain persons live with the student most or all of the time. These persons are the mother, another female guardian, the father and another male guardian (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz & Zuehlke, 2011a). From the answers four family forms have been created: ‘single parent family’, ‘nuclear family’, and ‘other family’. Single parent families are families in which only one parent or guardian is present. In a nuclear family both mother and father live with the child. The category ‘other family’ consists of all family forms (Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, Zuehlke, 2011c). Dummy variables of the four categories are used in the analysis, nuclear family being the reference category. Parental socioeconomic status is measured by an index of children’s socioeconomic background, combining information on the highest occupational status of the parents, the highest educational level of the parents in approximate years of education and the approximate number of books at home. These three variables were standardized. Afterwards a principal component analysis with these variables was conducted for each country. The factor scores for the first principal component of these analyses were used as the final scores on children’s socioeconomic background (Schulz, Ainley & Fraillon, 2011).
Region of origin
Neither secular and religious immigrant children nor immigrant children from different denominations are equally divided over the regions of origin (Association of Religion Data Archives [ARDA], n.d.). Instead their religious affiliation is related to their region of origin. Yet, macro-characteristics of the region or country of origin are related to civic attitudes and behaviour as well. For instance, the national religious context is related to volunteering, independent of one’s individual religiosity (Ruiter & de Graaf, 2006). Moreover, the type of regime immigrants used to live in, is associated with their support for democracy (Bilodeau, McAllister & Kanji, 2010). These macro-characteristics can both directly and indirectly be related to immigrant children’s attitudes. If they migrated themselves, the national context of their country of origin can be directly related to their civic attitude. However, their civic attitudes can also be related to characteristics of their country of origin indirectly, since the attitudes their parents transmit are associated with the national context in the country of origin. In other words, country of origin is related to both religious affiliation and civic attitudes, which is why it is important to control the relationship between religion and civic attitudes for country of origin.
We used information on the countries of birth of respondents and their parents to determine origin regions.5 Based on a division made by the UN seven categories were created: Africa, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe and Oceania (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). We also coded a separate category ‘region of origin unknown’. This is category is heterogeneous because the response options different between countries. We use dummy variables, with Western Europe as the reference category.
Figure 1: Boxplots of the support for democratic values for each religious group
Figure 2: Boxplots of the attitudes towards gender equality for each religious group
Figure 3: Boxplots of the attitudes towards the democratic destination country for each religious group
Analyses and results
Descriptive results
Figures 1 to 3 show boxplots of each dependent variable for the six religious groups. Three general conclusion seem merited from this description. First, on all three civic attitudes, intra-denominational differences are visible. Immigrant children who adhere to Islam and other Eastern religions seem slightly less supportive of democratic values than non-religious or Christian immigrant children. They are also on average less supportive of gender equality, although here, immigrant children who adhere to orthodox Christianity appear least supportive. Orthodox immigrant children also seem to hold least favourable views toward their destination country. Second, it is important to note that differences are rather small. Third, the figures also show the degree of dispersion in the three dependent variables. When comparing figure 3 to figure 1 and 2, it is clear that the variatio of attitudes towards the democratic destination country is larger than the variation of support for democratic values and attitudes towards gender equality. In other words, there are more different opinions between immigrant children of the same religious group about the democratic destination country than about democracy or gender equality.
Explanatory models and analytical strategy
For the estimation of our models we use SPSS, version 23. We estimate OLS regression models, in which we control for clustering within countries of origin and destination by adding dummies to the regression.6  The following formula was used for the estimation of our full models:
In which X is a vector for religion, Y is a vector for immigrant generation, Z is a vector for socioeconomic characteristics, A is a vector for region of origin and country of destination, B is a vector for religious service attendance, C is a vector for institutional trust, D is a vector for attitudes towards the influence of religion in society and E is a vector for civic knowledge and competences.
Regression results
Table 3 shows the relationships between religion and the support for democratic values, the attitudes towards gender equality and the democratic destination country. In Model 1, only religion and immigrant generation are included as predictors of civic attitudes. In Panel A the results for support for democratic values are presented. Here, it is shown that that immigrant children adhering to Islam are less supportive of democratic values than secular immigrant children. Christian and secular immigrant children do not differ in their support for democracy. The results of Model 1 with regard to attitudes towards gender equality are shown in Panel B. These results suggest that immigrant children that are Orthodox Christian or Islam support gender equality less than non-religious immigrant children and that Protestant migrant children support gender equality more. Immigrant children belonging to Catholicism don’t hold different opinions on gender equality than secular immigrant children. The results for attitudes towards the democratic destination country can be found in Panel C. Immigrant children adhering to Catholicism, Protestantism or Islam are more positive about the democratic country they live in than secular immigrant children. Conversely, Orthodox Christian immigrant children think less positively about the democratic destination country than secular immigrant children.
In Models 2 and 3 we add controls. The relationship between religion and the three civic attitudes is controlled for socioeconomic characteristics in Model 2. In general, this relationship decreases in size when compared to Model 1, meaning that the religious differences in civic attitudes can partly be interpreted as socioeconomic differences. The relationship between being Protestant and attitudes toward gender equality has even become insignificant. However, when looking the association between being an Orthodox Christian and attitudes towards gender equality in Panel B, it can be seen that the association has increased in size when Model 1 is compared to Model 2. The same happens to the relationship between being an Orthodox Christian and attitudes toward the democratic destination country in Panel C. This indicates that socioeconomic characteristics suppress the relation between being Orthodox Christian and the aforementioned civic attitudes.
In Model 3, the association between religion and civic attitudes is also controlled for region of origin and country of destination. Compared to Model 2, some relations between religion and civic attitudes have grown stronger, others have grown weaker. As can be seen in Model 3 of Panel B, the relationship between attitudes towards gender equality and Protestantism and Islam has grown in size. The relationship between attitudes towards gender equality and being Protestant has even become significant. All other relations decrease in size in Model 3 when compared to Model 2 and some even become insignificant. The latter is the case for the relationship between being Islamic and support for democratic values, as is shown in Panel A. It also holds for the association between attitudes towards the democratic country of destination and Christian Orthodoxy, which is shown in Panel C. The full models in which the parameters of unknown religion, immigrant generation, the socioeconomic characteristics, region of origin, and country of destination are included can be found in Appendix B.
The first hypothesis stated that religious immigrant children would have less positive civic attitudes than their secular counterparts. After controlling the relationship between religion and civic attitudes for immigrant generation, socioeconomic characteristics, region of origin and country of destination in Model 3, this is true for support for attitudes towards gender equality, as can be seen in Panel B. However, the opposite is found for attitudes towards the democratic destination. As is shown in Panel C, religious immigrant children are more positive towards the democratic destination country than nonreligious immigrant children. Our second hypothesis stated that there would be differences in civic attitudes between immigrant children of various denominations. Judging from the results in Model 3 these differences exist. Further analyses in which various religions were the reference category, show that after controlling for immigrant generation, socioeconomic characteristics, region of origin and country of destination, the civic attitudes of immigrant children of various denominations are significantly different.7
In Model 4, religious service attendance was added to the analyses. As can be seen in Panel A and B, it is irrelevant for one’s support for democratic values whether one attends religious services or not. This is not the case for attitudes towards the democratic destination country (Panel C). Immigrant children that attend religious services more often think more positively about their destination country.  After religious service attendance was included in the analyses in Model 4, the relationship between religion and support for gender equality has increased in strength, as is shown in Panel B. Yet, it must be noted that these increases are quite small. In Model 4 in Panel C the opposite happens. The relationship between being Catholic or Protestant and attitudes towards the democratic destination country has grown weaker. The same holds for Islamic migrant children and this relationship has become insignificant in Model 4. In our third hypothesis we expected religious service attendance to partly interpret the relationship between civic attitudes and religion. Yet, this can only be observed for attitudes towards the democratic destination country.
Our fourth hypothesis stated that the religious differences between immigrant children would decrease if controlled for the attitudes towards the influence of religion in society. As show in Model 5, immigrant children that think religion should have a bigger influence on society are less positive about gender equality (Panel B) but more positive about their democratic destination country (Panel C). After adding attitudes towards the influence of religion in society to the analyses the positive association between religious service attendance and support for gender equality becomes significant. Including attitudes towards the influence of religion in society in Model 5 decreases almost every relationship between religion and civic attitudes. The relationship between Islam and Orthodox Christianity on the one hand and gender equality (Panel B) on the other is partly explained. The same holds for the association between Catholicism and Protestantism and support for the democratic destination country (Panel C). All the aforementioned effects become insignificant. Conversely, the association between being Protestant and attitudes towards gender equality increases in strength and is now significant (Panel B).
In Model 6, civic competences and knowledge are included in the analyses. Their relation with civic attitudes is complex. It appears that immigrant children who discuss political and social issues more with family and friends are more supportive of equality between men and women, but less supportive of the democratic destination country. Yet, such discussions are irrelevant for one’s attitudes towards democratic values. Second, immigrant children with more interest in politics have more positive attitudes towards the democratic destination country. Political interest is unrelated to one’s support for democratic values and gender equality. Thirdly, the higher the sense of internal political efficacy immigrant children have, the less they are in favour of gender equality. Internal political efficacy is not associated with support for democratic values and attitudes towards the democratic destination country. Fourth, immigrant children that have more citizenship self-efficacy are more supportive of democratic values and have more positive attitudes towards the democratic destination country. Citizenship self-efficacy is unrelated to attitudes towards gender equality. Finally, immigrant children that have more civic knowledge are more supportive of democratic values and gender equality. However, civic knowledge is irrelevant for immigrant children’s attitude towards their democratic destination country. The inclusion of civic competences and knowledge in the analyses increases the size of the relationship between being Protestant and support for democracy in Model 6 when compared to Model 5. Yet, the association between being Protestant and attitudes towards gender equality becomes less strong.
Table 3: Regressions of religion on support for democratic values, attitudes towards gender equality and attitudes towards the democratic destination country (standardised beta coefficients) (N=5454)
 
Model 1a
Model 2b
Model 3c
Model 4c
Model 5c
Model 6c
Panel A Support for democratic values
No religion (ref.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic
0.003
 
0.004
 
-0.018
 
-0.022
 
-0.020
 
-0.019
 
Protestant
0.010
 
0.006
 
-0.017
 
-0.020
 
-0.018
 
-0.033
*
Orthodox
0.009
 
0.000
 
0.032
 
0.029
 
0.033
 
0.018
 
Islam
-0.048
**
-0.042
*
-0.024
 
-0.028
 
-0.022
 
-0.013
 
Other
-0.019
 
-0.013
 
-0.018
 
-0.019
 
-0.018
 
-0.008
 
Control variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migrant generation
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Socioeconomic
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Origin & destination
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Church attendance
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.010
 
0.015
 
-0.021
 
Att. influence religion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.015
 
0.033
*
Political discussion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.010
 
Political interest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.010
 
Int. political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004
 
Citizensh. self-efficac
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.132
***
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.297
***
R-Square
0.003
 
0.042
 
0.061
 
0.061
 
0.061
 
0.149
 
Panel B Attittudes towards gender equality
No religion (ref.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic
-0.016
 
-0.006
 
-0.023
 
-0.028
 
0.000
 
-0.001
 
Protestant
0.036
*
0.025
 
0.030
*
0.026
 
0.046
**
0.034
*
Orthodox
-0.187
***
-0.213
***
-0.066
**
-0.070
**
-0.023
 
-0.033
 
Islam
-0.101
***
-0.054
**
-0.076
***
-0.081
***
-0.017
 
-0.005
 
Other
-0.017
 
-0.009
 
-0.024
 
-0.025
 
-0.016
 
-0.009
 
Control variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migrant generation
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Socioeconomic
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Origin & destination
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Church attendance
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.011
 
0.067
***
0.043
**
Att. influence religion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.169
***
-0.115
***
Political discussion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.040
**
Political interest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001
 
Int. political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.077
***
Citizensh. self-efficac
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004
 
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.247
***
R-Square
0.038
 
0.200
 
0.238
 
0.238
 
0.255
 
0.297
 
Panel C  attitudes towards the democratic destination country
No religion (ref.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic
0.131
***
0.121
***
0.077
***
0.053
*
0.035
 
0.035
 
Protestant
0.102
***
0.090
***
0.052
***
0.037
*
0.025
 
0.024
 
Orthodox
-0.055
**
-0.068
***
0.014
 
-0.007
 
-0.037
 
-0.044
 
Islam
0.097
***
0.078
***
0.049
*
0.026
 
-0.014
 
-0.026
 
Other
0.035
*
0.037
**
0.025
 
0.020
 
0.015
 
0.014
 
Control variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migrant generation
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Socioeconomic
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Origin & destination
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
Church attendance
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.056
***
0.022
 
0.013
 
Att. influence religion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.105
***
-0.081
***
Political discussion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.040
**
Political interest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.151
***
Int. political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.018
 
Citizensh. self-efficac
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.111
***
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014
 
R-Square
0.033
 
0.067
 
0.167
 
0.169
 
0.176
 
0.208
 
aControlled for immigrant generation
bControlled for immigrant generation, age, gender, expected further education, use of state language, parental political interest, family form and parental socioeconomic status
cControlled for immigrant generation, age, gender, expected further education, use of state language, parental political interest, family form, parental socioeconomic status, region of origin and country of destination
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Source: ICCS
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we studied the relationship between immigrant children’s religiosity and their civic attitudes. Earlier research shows that there is a relationship between religiosity and both civic behaviour and civic attitudes, but this relationship has barely been studied for immigrants. In addition, there has barely been any research that takes denominational differences into account as well. Finally we tried to interpret the association between religiosity and civic attitudes by testing the role of religious attendance, attitudes towards the influence of religion in society, and civic competences and knowledge.
While we provide a sound quantitative analysis of possible explanations for differences in immigrant children’s civic attitudes, our research could be improved. One improvement would be to use better information about origin countries. First, there was a rather large group of children of whom the religion was unknown. These children were included in the analyses as a separate category, but it is possible that they actually belong in another category that wasn’t an option in their country of residence. In addition, we used region of origin instead of country due to a lack of data. Therefore, we were not able to control for country of origin as accurately as we wanted to. These problems could be solved in the future by using data in which the answers options didn’t differ between countries or in which the ‘other’ category was omitted completely. It is essential that subsequent waves of the ICCS data make an effort to gain better information about the countries of origin of pupils and their parents.
This study demonstrates that there are differences between religious and nonreligious immigrant children and between immigrant children from different denominations. In the case of the support for gender equality, there are clear differences between Eastern religions and Western Christian religions. In case of the attitudes towards the democratic destination country such contrast doesn’t exist. Here, there are differences between Orthodox Christian and Catholic, Protestant and Islamic immigrant children.
In addition, this study shows that the relationship between religiosity and support for democratic values and gender equality can largely be explained by religious attitudes and behaviors, such as church attendance and attitudes towards the influence that religion should have in society. Protestant children are more in favour of gender equality because they attend religious services more often. For Islamic and Orthodox Christian children, on the other hand, low support for gender equality goes hand in hand with wishing that religion should have a greater impact on society. Furthermore, Catholic and Protestant immigrant children as well as Islamic immigrant children hold more positive attitudes towards their destination countries. Yet, Islamic children do so because they attend religious services more often, whereas Catholic and Protestant children do so because they want religion to have a larger role in society.
 
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Questions used to create the dependent variables (support for democratic values, attitudes towards gender equality and attitudes towards the country of destination)
Support for democratic values
Cronbach’s α
There are different views about what a society should be like. We are interested in your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
0.652
 
ISP20A
Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely
 
 
ISP20E
All people should have their social and political rights respected
 
 
ISP20F
People should always be free to criticise the government publicly
 
 
ISP20H
All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely
 
 
ISP20I
People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair
 
Response options: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), strongly disagree (4)
 
Attitudes towards gender equality
 
There are different views about the roles of women and men in society. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
0.756
 
IS2P24C
Women should stay out of politics
 
 
IS2P24D
When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women
 
 
IS2P24F
Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women
 
Response options: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), strongly disagree (4)
 
Attitudes towards own country        
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about?
0.814
 
ISP28A
The is important to me
 
 
ISP28B
The political system in works well
 
 
ISP28C
I have great respect for
 
 
ISP28D
In we should be proud of what we have achieved
 
 
ISP28F
I am proud to live in
 
 
ISP28G
shows a lot of respect for the environment
 
 
ISP28H
Generally speaking, is a better country to live in than most other countries
 
Response options: strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), strongly disagree (4)
 
Appendix B: Full regression models
Table C.1: Regressions of religion on support for democratic values (standardised beta coefficients) (N=5454)
 
Model 1
 
Model 2
 
Model 3
 
Model 4
 
Model 5
 
Model 6
 
Religion (ref. = no religion)
Catholic
0.003
 
0.004
 
-0.018
 
-0.022
 
-0.020
 
-0.019
 
Protestant
0.010
 
0.006
 
-0.017
 
-0.020
 
-0.018
 
-0.033
*
Orthodox
0.009
 
0.000
 
0.032
 
0.029
 
0.033
 
0.018
 
Islam
-0.048
**
-0.042
*
-0.024
 
-0.028
 
-0.022
 
-0.013
 
Other
-0.019
 
-0.013
 
-0.018
 
-0.019
 
-0.018
 
-0.008
 
Religion unknown
-0.006
 
-0.003
 
-0.014
 
-0.016
 
-0.014
 
-0.006
 
First generation immigrant
-0.012
 
-0.014
 
-0.014
 
-0.014
 
-0.014
 
0.000
 
Age
 
 
0.010
 
0.010
 
0.010
 
0.011
 
0.017
 
Girl
 
 
0.016
 
0.020
 
0.019
 
0.019
 
0.001
 
Expected further education (ref. = don’t expect to complete ISCED 2)
ISCED 2
 
 
0.060
 
0.052
 
0.052
 
0.053
 
0.034
 
ISCED 3
 
 
0.188
***
0.182
***
0.181
***
0.182
***
0.122
*
ISCED 4 or 5B
 
 
0.162
***
0.190
***
0.190
***
0.190
***
0.122
**
ISCED 5A or 6
 
 
0.292
***
0.298
***
0.297
***
0.297
***
0.142
**
Not speaking the state language at home
 
 
0.014
 
0.014
 
0.013
 
0.014
 
0.035
*
Parental political interest (ref. = not interested at all)
Not very interested
 
 
0.059
 
0.045
 
0.044
 
0.045
 
0.009
 
Quite interested
 
 
0.124
**
0.106
*
0.105
*
0.106
*
0.035
 
Very interested
 
 
0.187
***
0.174
***
0.172
***
0.173
***
0.094
*
Family form (ref. = nuclear family)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single parent family
 
 
0.013
 
0.012
 
0.013
 
0.012
 
0.004
 
Other family
 
 
0.009
 
0.011
 
0.012
 
0.011
 
0.011
 
Parental socioeconomic status
 
 
0.059
***
0.052
***
0.052
***
0.050
***
-0.010
 
Country of destination (ref. = the Netherlands)
Austria
 
 
 
 
0.060
*
0.059
*
0.060
*
0.085
***
Cyprus
 
 
 
 
0.003
 
0.003
 
0.005
 
0.025
 
Denmark
 
 
 
 
0.043
 
0.043
 
0.044
 
0.070
**
Belgium (Flemish)
 
 
 
 
-0.036
 
-0.036
 
-0.036
 
0.000
 
Greece
 
 
 
 
0.004
 
0.004
 
0.006
 
0.031
 
Latvia
 
 
 
 
0.027
 
0.027
 
0.028
 
0.055
*
Liechtenstein
 
 
 
 
0.022
 
0.022
 
0.022
 
0.035
 
Norway
 
 
 
 
0.088
***
0.087
***
0.088
***
0.108
***
Poland
 
 
 
 
0.025
 
0.024
 
0.025
 
0.026
 
Switzerland
 
 
 
 
0.119
***
0.119
***
0.119
***
0.157
***
Region of origin (ref. = Western Europe)
Eastern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.036
 
-0.036
 
-0.036
 
-0.025
 
Northern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.013
 
-0.012
 
-0.012
 
-0.009
 
Southern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.034
 
-0.034
 
-0.033
 
-0.029
 
Asia
 
 
 
 
-0.071
***
-0.071
***
-0.071
***
-0.052
**
Africa
 
 
 
 
-0.021
 
-0.021
 
-0.020
 
-0.016
 
Latin America
 
 
 
 
-0.006
 
-0.006
 
-0.005
 
0.004
 
Oceania
 
 
 
 
0.009
 
0.008
 
0.008
 
0.011
 
Region of origin unknown
 
 
 
 
-0.039
 
-0.039
 
-0.039
 
-0.024
 
Attendance of religious services
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.010
 
0.015
 
-0.021
 
Attitudes towards the influence of religion in society
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.015
 
0.033
*
Discussion of political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.010
 
Interest in political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.010
 
Internal political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004
 
Citizenship self-efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.132
***
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.297
***
R-Square
0.003
 
0.042
 
0.061
 
0.061
 
0.061
 
0.149
 
Source: ICCS 2009
Table C.2: Regressions of religion on attitudes towards gender equality (standardised beta coefficients) (N=5454)
 
Model 1
 
Model 2
 
Model 3
 
Model 4
 
Model 5
 
Model 6
 
Religion (ref. = no religion)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic
-0.016
 
-0.006
 
-0.023
 
-0.028
 
0.000
 
-0.001
 
Protestant
0.036
*
0.025
 
0.030
*
0.026
 
0.046
**
0.034
*
Orthodox
-0.187
***
-0.213
***
-0.066
**
-0.070
**
-0.023
 
-0.033
 
Islam
-0.101
***
-0.054
**
-0.076
***
-0.081
***
-0.017
 
-0.005
 
Other
-0.017
 
-0.009
 
-0.024
 
-0.025
 
-0.016
 
-0.009
 
Religion unknown
-0.051
***
-0.030
*
-0.030
*
-0.033
 
-0.007
 
-0.003
 
First generation immigrant
-0.036
***
-0.021
 
-0.037
**
-0.037
**
-0.035
**
-0.025
*
Age
 
 
-0.054
***
-0.049
***
-0.049
***
-0.047
**
-0.038
**
Girl
 
 
0.359
***
0.354
***
0.354
***
0.348
***
0.323
***
Expected further education (ref. = don’t expect to complete ISCED 2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 2
 
 
-0.037
 
-0.050
 
-0.051
 
-0.044
 
-0.055
*
ISCED 3
 
 
0.004
 
-0.019
 
-0.020
 
-0.013
 
-0.050
 
ISCED 4 or 5B
 
 
0.033
 
-0.005
 
-0.006
 
0.000
 
-0.041
 
ISCED 5A or 6
 
 
0.082
 
0.060
 
0.059
 
0.060
 
-0.035
 
Not speaking the state language at home
 
 
-0.046
***
-0.045
***
-0.046
***
-0.033
**
-0.021
 
Parental political interest (ref. = not interested at all)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not very interested
 
 
0.048
 
0.036
 
0.035
 
0.045
 
0.026
 
Quite interested
 
 
0.061
 
0.051
 
0.050
 
0.064
 
0.039
 
Very interested
 
 
0.065
 
0.066
 
0.065
 
0.078
*
0.059
 
Family form (ref. = nuclear family)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single parent family
 
 
-0.005
 
0.006
 
0.006
 
0.003
 
0.001
 
Other family
 
 
-0.006
 
-0.007
 
-0.007
 
-0.010
 
-0.008
 
Parental socioeconomic status
 
 
0.079
***
0.077
***
0.077
***
0.059
***
0.024
 
Country of destination (ref. = the Netherlands)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria
 
 
 
 
-0.082
***
-0.082
***
-0.076
**
-0.053
*
Cyprus
 
 
 
 
-0.158
***
-0.159
***
-0.131
***
-0.112
***
Denmark
 
 
 
 
0.018
 
0.018
 
0.022
 
0.048
*
Belgium (Flemish)
 
 
 
 
-0.055
**
-0.055
**
-0.048
*
-0.022
 
Greece
 
 
 
 
-0.146
***
-0.146
***
-0.126
***
-0.094
***
Latvia
 
 
 
 
-0.214
***
-0.214
***
-0.204
***
-0.180
***
Liechtenstein
 
 
 
 
-0.023
 
-0.023
 
-0.027
 
-0.017
 
Norway
 
 
 
 
-0.064
**
-0.064
**
-0.052
*
-0.030
 
Poland
 
 
 
 
-0.076
***
-0.077
***
-0.070
***
-0.066
***
Switzerland
 
 
 
 
-0.068
*
-0.069
*
-0.070
*
-0.043
 
Region of origin (ref. = Western Europe)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.040
 
-0.039
 
-0.036
 
-0.021
 
Northern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.008
 
-0.008
 
-0.008
 
-0.003
 
Southern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.012
 
-0.012
 
-0.003
 
0.013
 
Asia
 
 
 
 
-0.038
 
-0.039
*
-0.036
*
-0.018
 
Africa
 
 
 
 
-0.027
 
-0.026
 
-0.021
 
-0.014
 
Latin America
 
 
 
 
0.003
 
0.003
 
0.009
 
0.019
 
Oceania
 
 
 
 
-0.018
 
-0.019
 
-0.019
 
-0.018
 
Region of origin unknown
 
 
 
 
-0.015
 
-0.015
 
-0.010
 
0.008
 
Attendance of religious services
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.011
 
0.067
***
0.043
**
Attitudes towards the influence of religion in society
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.169
***
-0.115
***
Discussion of political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.040
**
Interest in political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001
 
Internal political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.077
***
Citizenship self-efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004
 
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.247
***
R-Square
0.038
 
0.200
 
0.238
 
0.238
 
0.255
 
0.297
 
Source: ICCS 2009
Table C.3: Regressions of religion on attitudes towards the democratic destination country (standardised beta coefficients) (N=5454)
 
Model 1
 
Model 2
 
Model 3
 
Model 4
 
Model 5
 
Model 6
 
Religion (ref. = no religion)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic
0.131
***
0.121
***
0.077
***
0.053
*
0.035
 
0.035
 
Protestant
0.102
***
0.090
***
0.052
***
0.037
*
0.025
 
0.024
 
Orthodox
-0.055
**
-0.068
***
0.014
 
-0.007
 
-0.037
 
-0.044
 
Islam
0.097
***
0.078
***
0.049
*
0.026
 
-0.014
 
-0.026
 
Other
0.035
*
0.037
**
0.025
 
0.020
 
0.015
 
0.014
 
Religion unknown
0.027
 
0.025
 
0.008
 
-0.006
 
-0.022
 
-0.025
 
First generation immigrant
-0.025
 
-0.010
 
-0.046
***
-0.045
***
-0.046
***
-0.049
***
Age
 
 
-0.056
***
0.030
 
0.031
*
0.030
 
0.021
 
Girl
 
 
-0.032
*
-0.029
*
-0.029
*
-0.026
*
-0.021
 
Expected further education (ref. = don’t expect to complete ISCED 2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 2
 
 
0.077
*
0.059
*
0.057
 
0.054
 
0.050
 
ISCED 3
 
 
0.145
**
0.146
**
0.143
**
0.139
**
0.136
**
ISCED 4 or 5B
 
 
0.037
 
0.111
*
0.107
*
0.104
*
0.095
*
ISCED 5A or 6
 
 
0.118
*
0.144
**
0.139
**
0.138
**
0.118
*
Not speaking the state language at home
 
 
-0.037
*
-0.070
***
-0.075
***
-0.083
***
-0.085
***
Parental political interest (ref. = not interested at all)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not very interested
 
 
0.149
***
0.137
***
0.134
***
0.128
***
0.110
***
Quite interested
 
 
0.278
***
0.277
***
0.271
***
0.262
***
0.204
***
Very interested
 
 
0.319
***
0.322
***
0.315
***
0.307
***
0.227
***
Family form (ref. = nuclear family)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single parent family
 
 
-0.020
 
-0.006
 
-0.005
 
-0.004
 
-0.009
 
Other family
 
 
-0.006
 
0.004
 
0.006
 
0.007
 
0.006
 
Parental socioeconomic status
 
 
-0.078
***
-0.091
***
-0.091
***
-0.080
***
-0.092
***
Country of destination (ref. = the Netherlands)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria
 
 
 
 
0.052
*
0.049
 
0.045
 
0.034
 
Cyprus
 
 
 
 
0.014
 
0.009
 
-0.009
 
0.003
 
Denmark
 
 
 
 
-0.042
 
-0.040
 
-0.042
 
-0.040
 
Belgium (Flemish)
 
 
 
 
-0.093
***
-0.093
***
-0.097
***
-0.094
***
Greece
 
 
 
 
-0.033
 
-0.032
 
-0.045
 
-0.048
 
Latvia
 
 
 
 
-0.275
***
-0.274
***
-0.281
***
-0.284
***
Liechtenstein
 
 
 
 
0.054
**
0.054
**
0.056
**
0.053
**
Norway
 
 
 
 
0.101
***
0.099
***
0.092
***
0.086
***
Poland
 
 
 
 
-0.042
**
-0.048
**
-0.052
***
-0.053
***
Switzerland
 
 
 
 
0.117
***
0.115
***
0.116
***
0.105
***
Region of origin (ref. = Western Europe)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern Europe
 
 
 
 
0.016
 
0.017
 
0.015
 
0.006
 
Northern Europe
 
 
 
 
0.024
 
0.026
 
0.026
 
0.024
 
Southern Europe
 
 
 
 
-0.020
 
-0.021
 
-0.027
 
-0.041
*
Asia
 
 
 
 
-0.018
 
-0.020
 
-0.021
 
-0.026
 
Africa
 
 
 
 
-0.019
 
-0.019
 
-0.022
 
-0.025
 
Latin America
 
 
 
 
-0.026
 
-0.026
 
-0.030
*
-0.033
*
Oceania
 
 
 
 
0.001
 
-0.001
 
0.000
 
0.005
 
Region of origin unknown
 
 
 
 
0.034
 
0.034
 
0.031
 
0.024
 
Attendance of religious services
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.056
***
0.022
 
0.013
 
Attitudes towards the influence of religion in society
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.105
***
0.081
***
Discussion of political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.040
**
Interest in political and social issues
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.151
***
Internal political efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.018
 
Citizenship self-efficacy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.111
***
Civic knowledge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014
 
R-Square
0.033
 
0.067
 
0.167
 
0.169
 
0.176
 
0.208
 
Source: ICCS 2009
 
[1] Radboud University, Nijmegen, (The Netherlands), Email adress: marlou.ramaekers@hotmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-6951-1461
[2] Maastricht University,  Maastricht, (The Netherlands), Email adress: m.levels@maastrichtuniversity.nl, ORCID: 0000-0002-7516-3926
[3] Radboud University, Nijmegen, (The Netherlands), Email adress: G.Kraaykamp@ru.nl, ORCID: 0000-0001-5692-1907
† Jaap Dronkers passed away . He was affiliated with Maastricht University